Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2018)

Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2018) is a landmark case where the Supreme Court of India overruled Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, that criminalized adultery, deeming it to be unconstitutional. This judgment reasserted constitutional provisions of equality, personal liberty, and human dignity under Part III of the Constitution. The Court acknowledged that criminalizing adultery was based on patriarchal values and discrimination against women, offending Articles 14 and 21. The judgment was a milestone in the modernization of Indian criminal law and bringing it into consonance with modern constitutional morality.

The case was prompted by a challenge to Section 497 IPC, which criminally culpabilized a man for having sex with a married woman without the permission of her husband, and at the same time did not criminally culpabilize the woman herself. Petitioners contended that the law was discriminatory, breached the autonomy of women, and endorsed gender discrimination. The provision was defended by the Union Government as a law based on societal morality and safeguarding marital sanctity.

The Court posed a core constitutional question: whether criminalizing adultery under Section 497 IPC infringed fundamental rights of equality and personal liberty. The verdict touched upon wider issues of gender justice, autonomy, and the constitutional jurisprudence’s understanding of personal relationships.

Facts of the Case

Section 497 IPC criminalized adultery, punishing a man who had sexual relations with a married woman without her husband’s consent. Historically, the law treated women as passive property of their husbands, reflecting patriarchal attitudes.

Petitioners, including Joseph Shine, filed writ petitions challenging the section under Article 32, arguing that it violated Articles 14 and 21 by discriminating against men and women differently, and by infringing upon personal autonomy. The petitioners asserted that a married woman should not be criminally penalized, and the law’s gender bias was unconstitutional.

The Union Government argued that Section 497 upheld public morality, protecting marriage as an institution. The government contended that Parliament, not the judiciary, had the authority to

repeal or amend the law. Previous debates on adultery law and societal norms were cited in defense of the section.

Issues Involved

1. Whether Section 497 IPC, in criminalizing adultery, violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

2. Whether the law discriminates based on gender, perpetuating patriarchal norms. 3. Whether the autonomy and dignity of married women are infringed by criminalization. 4. Whether Parliament alone holds the power to repeal Section 497 IPC or if judicial intervention is warranted.

Petitioner’s Arguments

Petitioners had argued that Section 497 IPC offended the constitutional principles of personal liberty and equality. According to them, adultery is a private action between consenting adults and does not warrant interference by the state.

They underlined the gender discrimination in the provision, wherein only men could be prosecuted for adultery, and women were viewed as passive objects. The petitioners pointed out that criminalization disempowered the dignity and autonomy of married women and reaffirmed patriarchal social orders. Relevance was drawn to the principles in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India and K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, underscoring personal liberty and privacy.

Respondent’s Arguments

The Union Government contended that Section 497 IPC protected the institution of marriage and public morality. It justified criminalizing adultery on the premise that it was necessary to promote trust and chastity in marriage.

The government further contended that Parliament has the power of legislation to repeal or amend the law, and judicial intervention would be an interference with legislative power. It contended that societal values required the law as a deterrent against adultery and marital discord.

Judgment

The Supreme Court on 27th September 2018 unanimously declared Section 497 IPC as unconstitutional. According to the Court, adultery is a private consensual act between adults and should not be criminalized. Justice R.F. Nariman, while pronouncing the judgment, highlighted that the provision discriminated against men and women and reinforced gender discrimination under Articles 14 and 21.

The Court noted that patriarchal morality cannot be enforced by criminal law and dignity and personal autonomy have to be guarded. The gender discriminatory paradigm of Section 497 IPC was not in accordance with constitutional norms. The law was read down by the Court to characterize adultery as a civil wrong, not a criminal offense, while safeguarding the rights of citizens while upholding constitutional morality.

Ratio Decidendi

Criminalization of adultery under Section 497 IPC is unconstitutional as it violates equality and personal liberty guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21. The law discriminated against women and reinforced patriarchal norms. Adultery is a matter of personal autonomy and private morality, and criminal sanctions cannot be imposed for consensual acts between adults. Judicial intervention is justified to uphold constitutional morality and human dignity.

Observations by Individual Judges

• Justice R.F. Nariman: Emphasized that the law treats women as property and infringes autonomy, violating constitutional guarantees.

• Justice D.Y. Chandrachud: Highlighted the importance of personal liberty and the right to make intimate choices without state intrusion.

• Justice A.M. Khanwilkar: Noted that societal morality cannot justify gender discrimination embedded in criminal law.

• Justice Indu Malhotra: Observed that civil remedies can address marital breaches without resorting to criminal sanctions.

Analysis

The ruling brings Indian law in consonance with contemporary constitutional values of equality, freedom, and dignity. In decriminalizing adultery by striking down Section 497 IPC, the Court did away with gender discrimination and patriarchal application of morality. The ruling respects the independence of adults in intimate relationships and limits state intrusion to safeguard individual liberty. It reinforces the dynamic interpretation of Articles 14 and 21 consistent with modern social values.

Impact and Significance

The ruling has far-reaching implications for gender justice and individual autonomy in India. It contemporary criminal law by eliminating discriminatory provisions and prioritized constitutional morality over traditional societal norms. The ruling solidifies civil remedies for marital conflict as well as maintains basic rights. It also precedes judicial intervention whenever the law violates equality and dignity standards.

Conclusion / Final Decision

The Indian Supreme Court unanimously invalidated Section 497 IPC, legalizing adultery between consenting adults. The Court reiterated the right to personal choice, equality, and human dignity, contending that patriarchal moralization cannot justify criminalization. This ruling enforces constitutional morality, brings criminal law in line with basic rights, and guarantees that personal freedom and gender parity take precedence in Indian law.

References

1. Joseph Shine v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 194 of 2017, Supreme Court of India (Sept. 27, 2018).

2. India Const. art. 14.

3. India Const. art. 21.

4. Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 497.

5. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 76 of 2016, Supreme Court of India (Sept. 6, 2018).

6. K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012, Supreme Court of India (Aug. 24, 2017).

7. Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation, (2013) 1 SCC 1.

8. Indian Penal Code, 1860, §§ 375–376 (for context on personal autonomy and sexual conduct).

9. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948), arts. 12, 16.

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