Author: Supreet Kaur Sethi

On 10 December 2025, a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court (PHHC), comprising Justices Anupinder Singh Grewal and Mandeep Pannu, delivered a landmark decision reinstating the housing claims of several “jhuggi” (slum) dwellers under the Chandigarh Housing Board (CHB)’s Small Flats Scheme, 2006. The Bench set aside CHB’s earlier rejection of their applications, citing gross violation of principles of natural justice. The judgment, besides providing immediate relief to those directly affected, has broader implications it reaffirms the constitutional guarantee to shelter as part of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

The High Court’s reaffirmation that the right to housing forms part of Article 21 is not an isolated judicial observation; it stands firmly upon the bedrock of constitutional jurisprudence laid down four decades ago by the Supreme Court in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985). Popularly known as the “Pavement Dwellers’ Case,” Olga Tellis remains one of the most humane and progressive interpretations of the right to life. The Supreme Court held that the right to life under Article 21 is not confined to mere animal existence, nor is it restricted to physical survival. Instead, it encompasses the right to live with dignity, security, and meaningful human development. In a powerful passage that continues to shape rights-based jurisprudence, Justice P.N. Bhagwati observed that:

“The question which arises is whether the right to life includes the right to livelihood. We see only one answer to that question: the right to life cannot be restricted to mere animal existence. It includes the right to live with human dignity.”

This article examines the judgment, its legal foundations, and its broader implications for housing rights and administrative accountability in India.

Background: The Small Flats Scheme, 2006 and the Dispute 

In the year 2006 the Chandigarh Administration introduced the Small Flats Schemes,to rehabilitate jhuggi residents living in unplanned clusters. Under the scheme, eligible beneficiaries were to be allotted single-room flats on licence basis. Eligibility depended on inclusion in the 2006 biometric survey or relevant electoral rolls, and proof of continuous residence in designated colonies.Many applicants had been initially recommended by the Estate Office and the CHB itself. However, in September 2025, the CHB issued a joint rejection order denying housing claims of numerous applicants, without any prior notice or hearing. The order stated no detailed reasons for rejection and provided no opportunity for the affected individuals to respond or furnish clarifications. Which directly contradicts what was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985), the Court in that judgement had further explained that eviction of pavement dwellers without rehabilitation or alternative arrangements would deprive them of their livelihood and consequently violate their fundamental right to life. As the Court had stated:“If the right to livelihood is not treated as a part of the constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood.” Though the dwellers wee not living in the flats yet they still had claims towards the property that was promised to them through the scheme in question without any recourse of what should they do if their right was being rejected.

The petitioners challenged this decision under Article 226 of the Constitution, arguing arbitrariness, violation of natural justice, and breach of their fundamental right to housing under Article 21.Here the PHHC set aside the CHB’s rejection and  held that the decision was “unsustainable in law,” primarily because it had been passed “behind the back of the petitioners” without affording them a fair hearing. The Bench categorically observed:“It is manifest that the claim of the petitioners was under consideration… but the same has been rejected without issuance of any notice or granting an opportunity of hearing to them.”

This is a textbook violation of the audi alteram partem rule “hear the other side” a cornerstone of Indian administrative law. When State authorities exercise power affecting the rights, entitlements, or legitimate expectations of individuals, they are duty-bound to provide notice, opportunity to be heard, and a reasoned decision.The Court went beyond procedural defects and underscored the constitutional dimension:“Right to housing is an integral part of the right to life enshrined under Article 21.”This reiteration places the judgment firmly within India’s expansive human-rights framework.The Bench directed the CHB and Chandigarh Administration to reconsider all applications afresh, issue notices wherever clarification is required, and pass a speaking order within two months. Importantly, the Court ordered that status quo shall be maintained until a fresh decision is rendered.

Why is this judgment legally significant? 

1. Because it reinforces Article 21

The High Court’s articulation mirrors the Supreme Court’s consistent approach that Article 21 must be interpreted broadly to include the “right to live with human dignity.” Today, the right to life includes livelihood, shelter, health, environment, privacy, education, and more. By reaffirming housing as part of Article 21, the PHHC extends constitutional protection to one of the most vulnerable segments of society  the urban poor, who often face displacement without notice.

2.  Speaking Orders and Accountability of Public Authorities

The judgment reinforces the requirement of reasoned decision-making. Indian courts have repeatedly held that public authorities must deliver “speaking orders,” especially when rejecting rights-based entitlements. Arbitrary, unexplained decisions violate Articles 14 and 21.

3.  A Precedent for Urban Rehabilitation Across India

Though limited to Chandigarh, the ruling holds persuasive value for rehabilitation schemes in Mumbai, Delhi, Bengaluru, Hyderabad, and other cities where large informal settlements exist. The judgment strengthens the legal armour of slum dwellers facing eviction or exclusion from housing schemes.

The Punjab and Haryana High Court’s judgment serves as a strong reaffirmation of India’s constitutional commitment to human dignity. By holding that the rejection of jhuggi dwellers’ applications without notice violated natural justice and Article 21, the Court has extended meaningful protection to vulnerable urban communities.By invoking the spirit of Olga Tellis, the judgment reinforces a long-standing principle: the right to life under Article 21 is not confined to physical survival but includes the right to live with dignity, shelter, and security.

In a rapidly urbanising nation where millions continue to reside in informal settlements, this ruling acts as a steady constitutional guide. It underscores that governance must remain humane, fair, and rights-driven. Ultimately, the decision is not merely a procedural correction but a reminder of the Republic’s foundational values ensuring that the law supports and safeguards those who need it most.

REFERENCES

1. LiveLaw – “Right To Housing Integral To Right To Life Under Article 21: Punjab & Haryana High Court Orders Reconsideration Of Small Flats Allotment,” LiveLaw, 11 December 2025.
2. Bar & Bench -“Right to Housing Part of Right to Life; Chandigarh Housing Board must reconsider rejection of small flats applications: Punjab & Haryana High Court,” Bar & Bench, 11 December 2025.
3. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) 3 SCC 545. (Quoted for: right to life “more than animal existence”; right to livelihood; eviction without rehabilitation violates Article 21.)
4. Constitution of India – Article 21 (Right to Life)
5. Constitution of India – Article 226 (Writ Jurisdiction of High Courts).
6. Chandigarh Housing Board – Small Flats Scheme, 2006 (Official Scheme Document).
7. Chandigarh Administration – 2006 Biometric Survey Data (Eligibility basis referred in PHHC judgment).