Uday v. State of Karnataka (2003)

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Author: Mansewak Singh

Detail	Description
Court	Supreme Court of India
Date of the Judgement	19/02/2003
Case Type	Criminal Appeal (Appeal (crl.) 336 of 1996)
Bench	Justice Santosh Hegde and Justice B. P. Singh
Relevant Provision	Section 375 (Rape) and Section 90 (Consent known to be given under fear or misconception) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC)

The case is popularly known as the “promise to marry” case.

The appellant, Uday, and the prosecutrix, a 19-year-old college student, were neighbours who developed a romantic relationship. The appellant proposed marriage, but the prosecutrix initially declined due to known caste differences.
The couple continued the relationship, and the prosecutrix eventually consented to sexual intercourse based on the accused’s promise to marry her. They continued the relationship and sexual intercourse for several months.
The prosecutrix became pregnant and gave birth to a child on May 29, 1989.
The accused repeatedly promised to marry her but ultimately failed to fulfill the promise, leading the prosecutrix to file a police complaint.
The Trial Court and High Court held that the consent, though present, was obtained by fraud and deception (false promise of marriage), making it invalid under Section 375 read with Section 90 of the IPC, and convicted the appellant for rape.

Whether the consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse, based on the accused’s promise of marriage, constituted a misconception of fact under Section 90 of the IPC.
Whether such consent falls within the definition of rape under Section 375 of the IPC.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the accused of the charge under Section 376 IPC. The key points of the judgment are:

Consent was not Vitiated: The Court found that the consent given by the prosecutrix was voluntary, free, and conscious. The prosecutrix was a mature, college-going woman who was aware of the caste differences and potential family opposition to the marriage.
Misconception of Fact: The Court ruled that consent given on a promise of marriage to be fulfilled at a future date cannot automatically be considered a “misconception of fact” under Section 90 of the IPC. A belief that a future promise will be fulfilled is not a misconception of fact within the meaning of the Code.
Intention of the Accused: There was no conclusive evidence to prove that the accused never intended to marry the prosecutrix from the beginning, or that he had mala fide motives. The Court observed that her consent appeared to be driven by her deep love and passion for the accused, rather than being solely based on a fraudulent promise.
Distinction between Consensual Sex and Rape: The decision underlined the need to distinguish between consensual sex, even if influenced by emotional factors and a promise, and consent vitiated by an immediate and relevant misconception about the act itself.

The Supreme Court’s reasoning established a key legal principle regarding consent:

The consent given by a prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a person she is deeply in love with, based on a promise of marriage on a later date, cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact under Section 90 IPC.
A “false promise” is not a “fact” within the meaning of the IPC to vitiate consent, unless the promise induces an immediate and fundamental misconception about the nature of the act itself.
To constitute rape, it must be established that the accused had no intention of marrying the prosecutrix from the very inception and made the false promise in bad faith to exploit her only for sexual relations.

The Uday v. State of Karnataka judgment became a pivotal precedent in “promise to marry” cases, emphasizing that the validity of consent must be assessed based on the full context, including the prosecutrix’s maturity, awareness, and free will.
The ruling highlighted the legal distinction between a breach of promise (which may be a civil matter for damages) and consent vitiated by a misconception of fact that amounts to rape.
The decision set a guideline for future rulings, requiring courts to meticulously examine the accused’s initial intention—whether the promise was made with an honest intention that was later thwarted by circumstances, or if it was a false promise made from the start to satisfy lust.

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